A technician picks up a turbine component. Correct part number. Correct markings. Correct geometry. Every physical signal says airworthy. But without its paper trail, that part is legally identical to a counterfeit — and no inspection tool changes that. EASA has issued a warning about a compromised shipment of over 600 aircraft parts spanning four engine families. The theft itself is alarming. The deeper problem is what happens next. **Airworthiness is a legal construct, not a physical one.** A component becomes certified through its documentation — an EASA Form 1 or FAA 8130-3 release certificate — not through its metallurgy. These documents record every transfer of custody, every maintenance action, every inspection. Sever that chain and the part's history becomes unverifiable. It doesn't matter that the part may have come from a legitimate, serviceable source. Without provenance, regulators have no choice but to classify it as an unapproved part. This is why stolen certified parts and counterfeits converge into the same regulatory category. Once documentation is broken or forged, the distinction collapses. IATA has linked unapproved parts to roughly 174 accidents and incidents over several decades — a number built on exactly this kind of traceability failure. The exposure here is broad. Four engine families means potentially dozens of MROs and operators globally are in scope, not a single contained breach. **The timing compounds the risk.** Aviation is navigating a well-documented shortage of serviceable parts. When operators are under pressure to source components quickly, the incentive to accept parts with incomplete or reconstructed paperwork rises — and so does the vulnerability of the system designed to prevent it. The supply chain's integrity depends on every node holding. When one breaks, the question isn't whether the part works. It's whether anyone can prove it ever did.